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COMMENTS
IN RE FAUZIYA KASINGA: THE UNITED
.STATES HAS OPENED ITS DOORS TO
VICTIMS OF FEMALE GENITAL
MUTILATION
When I was about 5 years old, my father decided it was time for
me to be circumcised .... The woman who did it called herself a
"professional cutter," but she was just an old gypsy who traveled
around with her bag .... The old woman held a dirty razor blade,
and I could see the dried blood on it from the person she had cut
before me. I opened my legs, closed my eyes, and blocked my
mind .... The woman didn't just cut the clitoris-she cut every-
thing, including the labia. She then sewed me up tightly with a
needle .... They tied my legs together to stop me from walking,
so that I wouldn't rip open .... I bled for the next two, three
months. I nearly died. I wanted to die at the time-I had given
up on life.'
INTRODUCTION
Female genital mutilation ("FGM"), or "female circumci-
sion,"2 is an age-old cultural practice that involves incision, and
'Laura Ziv, The Tragedy of Female Circumcision: One Woman's Story, MARIE
CLAIRE, Mar. 1996, at 65.2 Although FGM has been commonly referred to as "female circumcision," it "is
not comparable to male circumcision, unless one considers circumcision amputa-
tion." 141 CONG. REc. H1695 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Schroeder).
See Mary Ann James, Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation: The Female
Genital Mutilation Act of 1993, H.R. 3247, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 206, 208
(1994) (noting that "the male equivalent to FGM would be the cutting and/or ampu-
tation of the penis and its surrounding tissues"). For a discussion of the varying
terminology for the procedure, see Blake M. Guy, Female Genital Excision and the
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usually removal, of part or all of the female external genitalia,3
which commonly results in serious health complications and
sometimes death.4 Despite the evident dangers involved, the
"tradition" endures in approximately forty African and Asian
countries and immigrant communities in several other coun-
tries,5 whose people support the practice with various unpersua-
sive justifications.' FGM is typically viewed as a rite of passage
for young girls, but is also performed on infants, toddlers, and
adult women.' The number of victims estimated to have suffered
from FGM thus far ranges from 80 to 130 million,8 and it contin-
Implications of Federal Prohibition, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 125, 128 n.18
(1995); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Hu-
man Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 4-8 (1995).
For convenience, "female genital mutilation" and "female circumcision" will be used
interchangeably throughout this Comment.
3 See Note, What's Culture Got to Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1946 (1993) [hereinafter What's Cul-
ture Got to Do With It?]. The female genitalia is comprised of the clitoris and the
clitoral prepuce, or hood, the labia majora (large lips of the vagina), and the labia
minora (small lips of the vagina). Id.
4 See infra Part I B discussing the physical and psychological effects of FGM.
5 See FRAN P. HOSKEN, STOP FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: WOMEN SPEAK:
FACTS AND ACTION 14 (1995); OLAYINKA KOSO-THOMAS, THE CIRCUMCISION OF
WOMEN: A STRATEGY FOR ERADICATION 17 (1987) (outlining practice of female cir-
cumcision in various countries); RAINBO, HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR WOMEN 3
(acknowledging existence of FGM in Africa and Asia and its recent spread to immi-
grant communities in Europe, Australia, Canada, and United States); Barbara
Crossette, Female Genital Mutilation by Immigrants Is Becoming Cause for Concern
in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at A18. "[Rlecently it has been found that
African and Middle Eastern immigrants to Europe, North America and Australia,
mostly refugees, continue to practice these mutilations on their children, no matter
where they go to live ....". For maps illustrating the geographic distribution of FGM,
see EFUA DORKENOO, CUTTING THE ROSE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: THE
PRACTICE AND ITS PREVENTION viii - xi (1994); see also Celia W. Dugger, Genital
Ritual Is Unyielding in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at Al (illustrating, statisti-
cally, the prevalence of FGM in Africa).
See infra Part I C (discussing some of the more commonly cited reasons for
continuing the practice); see also RAINBO, supra note 5, at 3 (listing some justifica-
tions for existence of this practice).
' The procedure is performed most frequently on girls between the ages of three
and eight, but other cultures mutilate infants, brides, and new mothers. Linda
Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women Under International Refugee
Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511, 526 (1993); see RAQIYA HAJI DUALEH ADDALLA,
SISTERS IN AFFLICTION: CIRCUMCISION AND INFIBULATION OF WOMEN IN AFRICA 11
(1982) (giving age at which procedure is performed in various countries).
8 The World Health Organization estimates that over 80 million females have
been subjected to FGM. Jennifer Bingham Hull, Battered, Raped and Veiled: The
New Sanctuary Seekers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, (Magazine), at 26. Some esti-
mates assert that as many as 110 million females have been genitally mutilated.
Stuart Wasserman & Maria Puente, Female Genital Mutilation Under Scrutiny at
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ues to rise at a rate of 2 million girls each year.9
Although human rights have long been recognized by the
United States and the international community,10 women who
suffer gender-based forms of persecution, such as FGM, have
continually failed to be protected.1 The United States, a pur-
ported leader in the human rights campaign, has historically re-
fused to expand existing immigration law to provide a safe haven
for women fleeing the torturous act of FGM.' Recently, how-
Hearing, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1994, at A3. Others purport that the number of vic-
tims may be as high as 130 million. NAHID TOUBIA, FEALE GENITAL MUTILATION:
A CALL FOR GLOBAL ACTION 21 (1995).
9 See Guy, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that World Health Organization has re-
ported at least two million victims of FGM each year); see also Ellen Goodman, An-
other Step Toward Redefining Abuse of Women, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1994, at
75; Two Million Women a Year Subjected to Sexual Mutilation, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File ("The latest
statistics show that there are now more mutilated girls and women in Africa than
ever before due to population growth."); FRAN B. HOSKEN, THE HOSKEN REPORT:
GENITAL AND SEXUAL MUTILATION OF FEMALEs 10 (1993); see also Guy, supra note
2, at 134 (indicating that decreasing frequency of this practice is substantially offset
by increase in population).
10 See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1229-34 (1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS] (listing human rights documents). For example, international
documents include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10,
1948, GJA. Res. 217A (IlI), U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976, GA. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976, GJA. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, re-
printed in 6 ILM 360 (1967) [hereinafter Economic Covenant]; the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, G.A_
Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 49), UN Doc. A/44149, (1989), reprinted in 28
ILM 1448 (1989). Regional instruments include the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed
Nov. 26, 1987, entered into force Feb. 1, 1989, Doc. No. H(87)4 1987, ETS 126, re-
printed in 27 ILM 1152 (1988); the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, signed June 9, 1994, en-
tered into force Mar. 3, 1995, reprinted in 33 ILM 1534 (1994); the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21,
1986, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 ILM 58 (1982).
" See Deborah Sontag, Asking for Asylum in U.S., Women Tread New Territory,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at Al ("Immigration law has tended to ignore the plight
of refugee women."); see also Sunny Kim, Gender-Related Persecution: A Legal
Analysis of Gender Bias in Asylum Law, 2 Am U. J. GENDER & L. 107, 108 (1994)
(recognizing that female victims of human rights persecution are not extended equal
protection).
"See Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An
Examination of Criminal and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 415, 417-18
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ever, in In re Fauziya Kasinga, the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals ("BIA") has taken a long-awaited first step and granted
asylum to a young African woman who escaped her homeland
and came to the United States in order to avoid genital mutila-
tion.
13
Part I of this Comment provides background information on
FGM, the types of procedures involved, its physical and psycho-
logical effects, and the reasons offered for its continuation. Next,
Part II discusses human rights in the international context, and
addresses some of the reasons why women's rights, although
protected in theory by international human rights doctrine, are
not typically secured in practice. Part III examines pertinent
United States immigration law and the requirements to obtain
refugee status. Finally, Part IV explains the BIA's rationale in
the Kasinga decision as well as its potential effects on future
gender-related asylum claims.
I. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
A. The Procedure
Female genital mutilation includes three types of proce-
dures. Clitoridectomy, the first and least severe form of FGM,
consists of cutting and removing the prepuce and part or all of
the clitoris.'4 The second and most common form of FGM, called
excision, involves the entire removal of the clitoris and labia mi-
nora."5 The third and most severe form of FGM is infibulation.
16
(1996) (noting United States' failure to respond to practice of FGM); Peter C. God-
frey, Defining the Social Group In Asylum Proceedings: The Expansion of the Social
Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J.L. & POLy 257, 273 (1994)
(indicating that United States courts have narrowly construed "particular social
group" so as to exclude aliens persecuted on basis of gender).
13 In re Fauziya Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA June 13, 1996); see infra Part IV
discussing the facts of the case and the rationale of the court.
'4 See ABDALLA, supra note 7, at 8; AsMA EL DAREER, WOMAN, WHY Do You
WEEP? 2 (1982); DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 5; KOSO-THOMAS, supra note 5, at 16.
In Muslim countries, clitoridectomy is also referred to as "sunna," which means
tradition. EFUA DORKENO0 & SCILLA ELWORTHY, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION:
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 7 (3d ed. 1992).
15 DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that "[alpproximately 80 per cent of
those affected undergo excision"); DORKENOO & ELWORTHY, supra note 14, at 7.
16 See ABDALLA, supra note 7, at 10; DORKENOO & ELwORTHY, supra note 14, at
7; Guy, supra note 2, at 131. Infibulation is sometimes referred to as "Pharonic cir-
cumcision" because it typically has been practiced in Egypt. HOSKEN, supra note 9,
at 33.
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During infibulation, the clitoris and labia minora are removed,
the labia majora are sewn together, typically with thorns, and a
sliver of wood is inserted to preserve an opening for the passage
of urine and menstrual blood.'7  The woman's legs are then
bound together for several weeks until the wounds have healed.'8
The age of the FGM victim varies from culture to culture.19
Regardless of the victim's age, however, the conditions under
which the operations are performed are unsanitary and anes-
thetics are rarely used.20 The "traditional surgeon" is typically
an elderly female member of the community whose instruments
may include unsterile razor blades, kitchen knives, and broken
glass.21 Sometimes the wounds are treated with native soap,
palm oil, vaseline, kerosene, or engine oil."
B. The Effects
The physical effects of FGM vary with the degree of hygiene
used during the operation and the deportment of the woman
throughout the procedure.' Common immediate effects include
" See DORKENoo, supra note 5, at 5; DoRKENoo & ELWORTHY, supra note 14, at
7; see also Guy, supra note 2, at 131; What's Culture Got to Do with It?, supra note 3,
at 1947.
18 See DAREER, supra note 14, at 2; DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 5; DORKENOO &
ELWORTHY, supra note 14, at 7; see also What's Culture Got to Do with It?, supra
note 3, at 1947.
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing age range of FGM vic-
tims); see also DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 10-12. In Togo, girls are cut at earlier
ages, before they are old enough to escape. Celia W. Dugger, A Refugee's Body Is In-
tact but Her Family Is Torn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. In some cultures,
circumcision is performed on pregnant women to prevent spiritual or physical injury
to the baby during childbirth, which is believed to occur if the baby's head touches
the clitoris. See What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1950. For a
breakdown of the types of circumcision and the ages of the victims, see DAREER, su-
pra note 14, at 13.
20 What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1947 (stressing that same
blade is often used for several circumcisions). Sometimes earth, ashes or even cow
manure is applied to the genitals to stop the bleeding. Bashir, supra note 12, at 421
(citing Roger Kaplan, Prisoners of Ritual, 25 FREEDOM REV. 25, 26 (1992)).
21 Bashir, supra note 12, at 421; What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3,
at 1947. In some parts of Nigeria, the village barber performs the ritual. What's Cul-
ture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1947. Over 90% of circumcisions are per-
formed by midwives, more than half of whom are untrained. See DAREER, supra
note 14, at 14. For an illustration of how the procedure is performed, see TOUBIA,
supra note 8, at 11
2What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1947.
2DORKENO0, supra note 5, at 13; KOSO-THoMAS, supra note 5, at 25. Because
no anesthesia is used, the experience is obviously quite painful. See Guy, supra note
2, at 133 (noting unavailability of anesthesia). The victim, therefore, must be held
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excruciating pain, hemorrhage, shock, infection, and possibly
death. 4 The equally shocking long-term physical consequences
can include urinary infection, vaginal abscesses, infertility,
scars, and cysts which can grow large enough to require surgical
removal.25 The infibulated woman frequently experiences painful
sexual intercourse and childbirth because she must undergo re-
peated disinfibulation and reinfibulation.6
FGM also causes psychological damage. In addition to the
anxiety suffered as the imminent operation approaches, the
FGM victim often feels betrayed by the family members who
forcibly held her down and allowed the operation to occur.' Fur-
down forcibly by several women. See id. (indicating that girl's female relatives
forcibly restrain her during procedure).
24 DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 13-15; see DAREER, supra note 14, at 30-35
(detailing immediate post-circumcision problems). It has been estimated that 15% of
all circumcised females die from complications. Judy Mann, Torturing Girls Is Not a
Cultural Right, WASH. PosT, Feb. 23, 1994, at E13.
See DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 15-17 (discussing long term complications);
Bashir, supra note 12, at 422-23; Kris Ann Balser Moussette, Female Genital Muti-
lation and Refugee Status in the United States - a Step in the Right Direction, 19
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 365-67 (1996). See generally DAREER, supra note 14,
at 35-49 (detailing complications resulting from FGM, particularly those that are
sexual in nature). The women frequently experience difficulty passing menstrual
blood, which can lead to infection. Id. In an extreme case, a young girl, whose cir-
cumcision had been performed so tightly that she could barely pass any menstrual
blood, was killed to protect family honor because the accumulation of blood in-
creased her abdomen to the point that her family thought she was pregnant. Id. at
37. "Because some effects are not immediately apparent, the woman or child, her
parents and family, the community, and the practitioner may not acknowledge the
causal connection between the operation and the complications that materialize
years later." Moussette, supra, at 363.
2'6 For a discussion of disinfibulation and reinfibulation, and the reasons for and
effects of the procedures, see DAREER, supra note 14, at 50-65. The infibulated
woman may be disinfibulated on her wedding night by her husband, who uses a
dagger to allow for penetration. DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 13. If a pregnant
woman is not disinfibulated, at childbirth "the baby can explode out of that tiny
opening and tear the mother every which way, into her anus and bladder." Mous-
sette, supra note 25, at 366 (quoting Judy Steed, Mission to Stop Female Genital
Mutilation: Health Workers Fear Girls Could Die Because of Practices Done in Se-
cret, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 1994, at E4).
27 See DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 24-27 (explaining psychological effects of
FGM); Lori Ann Larson, Note, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States:
Child Abuse or Constitutional Freedom?, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 237, 239 (1996)
(noting young girl's feeling of betrayal by family members who forced her to undergo
procedure); see also Moussette, supra note 25, at 366-67 (stressing that resulting
psychological harm is life long). "[Tihe terrible suffering and severe psychological
trauma that FGM imposes on female children and women at an early age and
throughout their lives can never be measured. They are a social burden of sexual
violence imposed by the traditional patriarchal system on those least able to protect
[Vol.71:433
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thermore, the woman's obligation to engage in painful and un-
desirable sexual intercourse with her husband can result in
permanent psychological damage.'
C. The Unjustified Justifications
Supporters of female circumcision assert several justifica-
tions for the practice. Among the most common reasons offered
for the performance of FGM are religious beliefs, tradition,
health, aesthetics, and morality.29
The rationale that FGM is based on religious beliefs is mis-
guided. In the countries that practice FGM, the predominant
religions observed are Christianity and Islam; yet neither the
Bible nor the Koran require female circumcision."0 Proponents of
the practice, however, argue that virginity and modesty, both of
which are valued in the Bible and the Koran, necessitate the re-
moval of the clitoris, which is believed to make women promiscu-
ous.31
The most frequently cited justification for the continuance of
FGM is the reluctance to break a custom that has endured for
centuries.32 The communities that engage in the ritual view it as
themselves." HOSKEN, supra note 5, at 14.
See DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 17-24 (discussing sexual health problems re-
lated to FGM including painful sexual intercourse and deprivation of sexual in-
stinct); see also DAREER, supra note 14, at 40-49 (discussing effects of circumcision
on sexual relations).
29 See DAREER, supra note 14, at 67-76 (analyzing justifications for existence of
FGM); DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 34-41 (same). But see DAREER, supra note 14, at
78-82 (discussing reasons for rejecting continuance of circumcision).
" See DoRKENOO, supra note 5, at 36-39 ("[There is no basis in the various re-
ligious texts for FGM but rather it is how these religious books have been inter-
preted to the people that matters."); Anna Funder, De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The
Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3 TRANSNATL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 417, 436 (1993).
But see DAREER, supra note 14, at 72 (noting that while Koran does not mandate
circumcision, it is implicitly discussed by Prophet Mohammed).
3"KOSO-THOTAS, supra note 5, at 8, 9; see DAREER, supra note 14, at 75
(quoting belief that "[i]f [the woman was] left ... uncircumcised, she [would] wander
about looking for men, she [would] be a prostitute"); see also Larson, supra note 27,
at 240 (explaining belief that clitoris causes women to be oversexed, to make uncon-
trollable sexual demands on their husbands, and to eventually commit adultery).
2 Some scholars estimate that FGM began more than 2,000 years ago, before
the arrival of Christianity or Islam. Dugger, supra note 5, at Al; see Karen Hughes,
Note, The Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation in the United States, 4 J.L.
& POL'Y 321, 330 (1995) (indicating that FGM predates Christianity and Islam). For
a contrary position on the role of custom and tradition, see Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
1997]
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a sacred tradition that "symbolizes the shared heritage of a par-
ticular ethnic group."3 Uncircumcised women are frequently os-
tracized for deviating from the social mores of the community.'
Ironically, those who practice FGM also justify the proce-
dure on hygienic or aesthetic grounds. 5 The uncircumcised fe-
male is considered dirty and impure, and the female genitalia is
thought to be ugly, thereby necessitating its removal.36 The ar-
gument that FGM promotes cleanliness, however, is wholly un-
founded. The retention of urine and menstrual blood, which
typically results from FGM, can lead to many health complica-
tions ranging from discomfort to infection. In addition, al-
though "beautiful" is a relative term, the hardened scar and
stump that is left in place of the clitoris can hardly be thought of
as aesthetically pleasing." Nevertheless, even beauty cannot
serve as a valid justification for the infliction of pain or the re-
moval of a body part. The idea, therefore, that a healthy organ
must be mutilated against the victim's wishes in order to attain
"beauty" is questionable at best.
"In addition to the religious arguments in favor of chastity,
advocates point to the prevention of promiscuity as a separate
IV.").
3 Moussette, supra note 25, at 360 (citing Koso-THOMAS, supra note 5, at 8);
What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1949.
' Bashir, supra note 12, at 426; see also DAREER, supra note 14 at 69 (noting
social stigma attached to deviation from custom); See How Africa Understands Fe-
male Circumcision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at A24. ("The importance of the
ceremony among traditional Kikuyu cannot be understated ....").
35 DAREER, supra note 14, at 73; KOSO-THOMAS, supra note 5, at 7; DORKENOO,
supra note 5, at 40. In parts of Africa, the female genitalia are considered dirty. Id.
For example, in Egypt, the uncircumcised female is referred to as "nigsa," meaning
unclean. Id.
36 DAREER, supra note 14, at 73. Some mothers, when asked why they circum-
cise their daughters, responded, "[wle cannot leave them dirty and impure and
smelly." Id. It is also believed that the female must be made beautiful through cir-
cumcision. Id.
37 DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that discomfort, odor, and infection
result from inability of urine and menstrual blood to escape naturally). Quite often,
the effects of FGM are far more severe. See supra Part I B. There are no known
medical justifications for practicing FGM on healthy women. Minority Health Im-
provement Act of 1994, H.R. REP. No. 103-501, at 66 (1994).
3 "Many Somali women, when they go to the hospital before giving birth, have
been made to feel like freaks ... [dioctors and nurses come running, to stare at
them." Moussette, supra note 25, at 363 (quoting Judy Steed, Mission to Stop Fe-
male Genital Mutilation: Health Workers Fear Girls Could Die Because of Practices
Done in Secret, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 1994, at E4); see Larson, supra note 27, at
240 (stressing unattractiveness of stump and scar left in place of excised clitoris).
[Vol.71:433
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and distinct reason to continue the practice of female circumci-
sion."" Proponents maintain that it must be removed to sup-
press the desire to seek extramarital affairs because they believe
the clitoris makes women lascivious. 40 Thus, circumcised women
are more "marriageable," 1 and men are assured that future
pregnancies are not the result of infidelity.42
The reasons cited for the practice of mutilation fail to justify
what, in actuality, amounts to physical and psychological tor-
ture. Despite the justifications, FGM merely emerges as a vehi-
cle to ensure that women remain subordinate in a male-
dominated society.43 In a community where women are economi-
cally dependent on their husbands, marriage is imperative and
women, therefore, compelled to submit to circumcision in order
to survive." Thus, the vicious cycle of mutilation endures, as
successive generations of women impose the practice onto them-
selves and their daughters.45
39 What's Culture Got to Do With It?, supra note 3, at 1952 (citing Koso-
THOMAS, supra note 5, at 8); see also HANNY LIGHTFOOT-KLEIN, PRISONERS OF
RITUAL 39 (1989) ("The belief that uncircumcised women cannot help but exhibit an
unbridled and voracious appetite for promiscuous sex is prevalent in all societies
that ractice female circumcision.").
DAREER, supra note 14, at 75; DORKENOO, supra note 5, at 35; KOSO-THOMAS,
supra note 5, at 8. But see DAREER, supra note 14, at 75 ("Infibulation can ... en-
courage misbehaviours [sic] because only recircumcision is necessary to restore an
appearance of virginty....").
"' Uncircumcised women are considered "unclean, oversexed and unmarriage-
able." Shannon Brownlee et al., In the Name of Ritual, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 56, 58. In Sudan, marriage is considered a privilege for women;
thus, no woman would risk rejection by not being circumcised. DAREER, supra note
14, at 73. Men prefer circumcised women because the vaginal passage is tighter,
providing more sexual satisfaction for the man. Id. at 74. While this causes inter-
course to be painful for women, they do not protest because they believe it is their
duty to make intercourse as satisfying as possible for their husbands. Id. at 74-75.
4 LIGHTFOOT-KLEIN, supra note 39, at 29 (noting that circumcision preserves
monogamy).
' Daliah Setareh, Women Escaping Genital Mutilation - Seeking Asylum in the
United States, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 129-130 (1995). "African boys who grow
up in families where girls are routinely mutilated, where women are beaten and
violated and treated like slaves accept such behavior as normal." HOSKEN, supra
note 5, at 5.
4 Guy, supra note 2, at 146 (noting importance of marriage given women's eco-
nomic instability); Setareh, supra note 43, at 129-31.
4 Id. at 130 ("Mt is the women themselves who enforce the practice...."). Moth-
ers continue to subject their daughters to FGM in order to ensure marriage.
Brownlee et al., supra note 41, at 56, 58.
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II. FGM IN THE INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT
The international community has taken great strides with
regard to the protection of human rights. For example, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") protects the
"right to life, liberty and security of person," and prohibits "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."46 Likewise,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") provides for similar protections.47 The United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees"4 and the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees49 reempha-
sized the international community's concern for human rights by
precluding deportation if a person's life or freedom is jeopardized
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion." Notwithstanding the
fact that both the UDHR and the ICCPR afford their stated
rights equally to both men and women,"' the human rights of
women have routinely been, and continue to be, violated.52
46 UDHR, supra note 10, arts. 3 & 5, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, at 1157.
" ICCPR, supra note 10, pmbl., reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 10, at 1161.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951)
[hereinafter Refugee Convention].
41 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967)
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
Refugee Convention, supra note 48, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176, art. 33; Refugee Pro-
tocol, supra note 49, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268, art. I.
5' UDHR, supra note 10, pmbl., reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, at
1156; ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 3, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, at
1162. The foundation of women's rights being recognized as human rights began in
1945, when the United Nations Charter ("U.N. Charter"), sought to "solv[e] inter-
national problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character" and
"promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to ... sex ....", U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 para. 3. The U.N.
Charter also stated as one of its underlying tenets "the equal rights of men and
women." Id. at pmbl.
52 Notwithstanding the existing 'paper rights,' the universal fact is that
women are routinely subjected to torture, starvation, terrorism, humilia-
tion, mutilation, rape, multiple birth and other maternity-related health
risks, economic duress, and sexual exploitation, simply because of their
sex. Recurrently, these inflictions on women because of their sex are jus-
tified or explained by culture and tradition: genital mutilation, female in-
fanticide, bride burning, foot-binding, slavery, face-hiding, wife-beating,
honor-killing, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, and multiple, early and
closely spaced, child-bearing and birthing, to name but a few.
Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Women's Rights As Human Rights - Rules, Re-
alities and the Role of Culture: A Formula For Reform, 21 BROOK J. INTL L. 605,
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One explanation for the continuance of these violations is
the public/private dichotomy in the human rights context. Ac-
tions that are unregulated by the government are traditionally
thought of as "private," as illustrated in the aphorism "a man's
home is his castle."53 As a result, persecution is presumed to be
only that which a person suffers due to governmental oppression,
which is typically experienced by men.' Thus, because women
usually suffer persecution in the private sphere,55 their persecu-
tion is recognized only when it fits within the male norm.
Feminist scholars have argued that this distinction has been
manufactured by the patriarchal concept that human rights in
the public sphere, typically dominated by men, are more deserv-
ing of protection than human rights of women, which are gen-
erally violated in the private sphere of their home and commu-
nity." It is asserted that the recognition of gender-based asylum
claims would serve to promote the acknowledgment of women's
rights as human rights and initiate the eradication of the unjus-
tified public/private differentiation.
Those who support the continuance of female circumcision,
as well as other forms of gender-based persecution, hide behind
634-38 (1996).
See Felicite Stairs & Lori Pope, No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant
Women's Claims for Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian and Compas-
sionate Grounds, 6 J.L. & SOC. POLY 148, 182-187 (1990).
' Id.; see, e.g., Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
applicant's claim that government official sexually harassed her was personal in na-
ture and therefore not deserving of asylum relief).
Stairs & Pope, supra note 53, at 182-87.
The key criteria for being a refugee are drawn primarily from the realm of
public sphere activities dominated by men. With regard to private sphere
activities where women's presence is more strongly felt, there is primarily
silence - silence compounded by an unconscious calculus that assigns the
critical quality 'political' to many public activities but few private ones.
Thus, state oppression of a religious minority is political, while gender op-
pression at home is not.
Nancy Kelly, Gender Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INhTL L.J. 625, 628 (1993) (quoting Doreen Indra, A Key Dimension of
the Refugee Experience, 6 REFUGEE 3 (1987)).
6' For feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy in international law, see
Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUTAN RIGHTS OF
WOmEN 85 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Ap-
proaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 625-34, 638-41 (1991); Re-
becca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7
HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 125, 150-53 (1994). But see Fernando R. Tyson, Feminism and
International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. ImNt L. 647, 670-72 (1993) (arguing that there
is no conspiracy and explaining some reasons for keeping private spheres).
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the shield of "cultural relativism" by arguing that others should
not pass judgment and condemn the traditions and practices of
cultures different from their own.57 The cultural relativism ar-
gument creates a conflict between the "right of men to live in
terms of their own traditions" and "respect for the individual as
an individual."58 While cultural relativists argue that cultural
behavior should be judged through the norms and customs of the
specific culture, universalists maintain that basic human rights
standards must apply equally to all nations and cultures.59
The torturous act of female genital mutilation clearly vio-
lates all of the above mentioned human rights documents. Fur-
thermore, the infliction of severe pain and suffering that is
forced upon a woman, with governmental acquiescence, for the
mere preservation of unnecessary ancient custom, serves no
other purpose than to insure male dominance and female subor-
dination. °
Recognizing that, despite the numerous human rights doc-
57 See generally Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on
International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 L. &
INEQ. J. 367 (1989) (questioning whether United Nations criticism of long standing
cultural practices is appropriate).
Cultural relativism asserts that the practices within any specific culture
are unique to the values, systems, and practices within that culture. For
the cultural relativist there are no universal standards and the morality
and values of one national culture cannot be compared to that of any other.
Cultural relativism dominates social, political and academic thought today
and it serves as a justification of many inhuman social practices ... There is
nothing unique across cultures in the practices of the enslavement of
women except perhaps the diversity in the strategies men employ to carry
them out ....
KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 139-140 (1979).
"American Anthropologist Association, Statement on Human Rights by the Ex-
ecutive Board, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 543 (1947); see also Brennan, supra note 57,
at 368 (comparing cultural relativist's viewpoint of established traditions against
human rights proponents' beliefs in certain understandable and universal individual
rights).
See Lewis, supra note 2, at 17-18. Cultural relativists argue "that cultural be-
havior should be judged only through culturally specific, rather than universal,
norms and values." Id. at 17. Universalists subscribe to the belief that "the interna-
tional community has an obligation to protest human rights violations wherever
they are perpetrated." Id. at 19.
"Lewis, supra note 2, at 23-25; Setareh, supra note 43, at 129-31. "FGM has
been characterized as 'sexual oppression' that is 'based on the manipulation of
women's sexuality in order to assure male dominance and exploitation.' " NAHID
TOuBiA, FEMALE GENITAL MuTILATION: A CALL FOR GLOBAL ACTION 12, 24-25
(1993) (quoting Raqiya Haji Dualeh Abdalla, Somali Women's Democratic Organi-
zation).
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trines already in existence, "extensive discrimination against
women continues to exist,6 1 the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW) 62 was
established in 1979 to "condemn discrimination against women
in all its forms."" In particular, the document specifically seeks
to eradicate conventions that serve to discriminate based on
gender.' A major setback for the CEDAW, however, is the high
number of reservations that were taken by some countries when
ratifying the document.65 For instance, Iraq has taken reserva-
tion to several sections, including article 2, paragraph (f), which
requires action to "modify or abolish existing laws, ... customs
and practices" that discriminate against women.66 Despite the
explicit prohibition against reservations that are "incompatible
with the object and purpose" of the document,67 reservations such
as those taken by Iraq jeopardize the force of the CEDAW and
intimate that international obligations imposed by the CEDAW
are disparate and less binding than those of other human rights
treaties.'
6' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 15 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The Human Rights Watch es-
tablished the Women's Rights Project in 1990 to "monitor violence against women
and discrimination on the basis of sex that is either committed or tolerated by gov-
ernments." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 345 (1996). The project was de-
veloped from the "recognition of the rampant levels of gender-based violence and
discrimination around the world and of the past failure of human rights organiza-
tions, and the international community, to hold governments accountable for abuses
of women's basic human rights." Id.
See CEDAW, supra note 61.
63CEDAW, supra note 61, art. 2, at 16.
eCEDAW, supra note 61, art. 2(f), at 16. The campaign against female circum-
cision finds further support in the European Commission on Human Rights, which
interpreted "inhuman" treatment, within the UDHR, to constitute "at least such
treatment as deliberately caus[ing] severe suffering, mental or physical."
cINTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 918; see also Rebecca J.
Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, 30 VA. J. INTL L. 643, 644 (1990) ("The volume of reservations
brings this Convention among the most heavily reserved of international human
rights conventions....").
6 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 921. See generally Belinda
Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Dis-
crimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INVL L. 281 (1991); Cook, supra note 65, at
714-16 (1990) (listing nation's reservations and objections to CEDAW).
6CEDAW, supra note 61, art. 28 (2), at 23.
es Clark, supra note 66, at 285-86.
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III. UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
Despite the global community's outcry against female geni-
tal mutilation,69 the United States has been reluctant to recog-
nize FGM as grounds for granting asylum. 70 The 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees,' which the United States
signed onto in 1968, adopted articles 2 through 34 of the 1951
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, codified
within the Immigration and Nationality Act,' 3 which incorpo-
rated many of the United States' Protocol obligations. The Refu-
gee Act was created to develop a "humanitarian refugee policy
with a broad scope that conformed to United States international
law obligations." 4
The Refugee Act provides that, at the Attorney General's
discretion, asylum may be granted to any person who meets the
statutory definition of "refugee."75 The term "refugee," within the
meaning of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, applies to:
' "FGM has been condemned by such groups as the United Nations, the World
Health Organization, and the American Medical Association." TOUBIA, supra note
60, at 45-46 (quoting Raqiya Haji Dualeh Abdalla, Somali Women's Democratic Or-
ganization); see also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Memoran-
dum: UNHCR Position On Female Genital Mutilation (May 10, 1994) (stating that
FGM is "an act which causes severe pain as well as permanent physical harm, [and]
amounts to a violation of human rights."). FGM violates many rights that are pro-
tected by international human rights documents. See UDHR, supra note 10, art. 3,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, at 1157 (right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of person); ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 6, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, at 1163 (same); Economic Covenant, supra note 10, art. 12, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, at 1178 (right to highest standard attainable of
physical and mental health).
70 Bashir, supra note 12, at 437; see Pamela Constable, INS Debates Female Mu-
tilation as Basis forAsylum, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1995, at D1.
" Refugee Protocol, supra note 49. American refugee law is based primarily on
the Refugee Protocol, which the U.S. signed onto to satisfy its obligations to pre-
serve human rights. See Kathryn M. Bockley, Comment, A Historical Overview of
Refugee Legislation: The Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 253, 278-79 (1995).
72 Refugee Convention, supra note 48; see Mousette, supra note 25, at 380.
73 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). The purpose of the Refugee Act was to offer "liberty
and safety to persons from other lands who are persecuted." Doris Meissner, Reflec-
tions on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN
THE 1980s, THE NINTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 57, 59 (David
A. Martin ed., 1988). For a discussion of the history, adoption, and implementation
of the Refugee Act, see Bockley, supra note 71, at 278-86.
' Linda Dale Bevis, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International
Sources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (1988); see Bockley, supra note 71, at 281.
75 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
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any person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwill-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion ......
Accordingly, a woman seeking asylum in the United States
must demonstrate four factors: that she has a fear of persecu-
tion; that her fear is well-founded; that the persecution will be
inflicted by the government or by an individual the government
cannot or will not control; and that the persecution is on account
of one of the five specified grounds.
If an asylum applicant has established refugee status but
nevertheless is denied a discretionary grant of asylum, the court
must then determine whether to withhold deportation.77 A court
must withhold deportation to a country if the "alien's life or free-
dom would be threatened in such country on account of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."78 The applicant seeking a withholding of de-
portation must meet a higher standard of proof than is required
to establish refugee status, namely a clear probability of perse-
cution.79 The failure to establish refugee status thus precludes
the alien from obtaining an order withholding deportation."
Gender-based claims do not fit easily into the statutory defini-
tion of refugee because gender is not one of the enumerated
grounds to define refugee status. Consequently, there is very
little case law in the United States dealing with FGM victims
76 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (1994); see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 (1984) (noting
that every alien who qualifies as refugee is not entitled to withholding of deporta-
tion). An asylum application is also examined as an application for withholding of
deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b).
78 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1); see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987)
(noting that withholding deportation is not discretionary).
79 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 430. A clear probability means the persecution is more
likely to occur than not. Id. at 429-30; Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1578
(9th Cir. 1986).
6 See, e.g., Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 641 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that failure
to meet standard for eligibility for asylum is also failure to meet standard for with-
holding of deportation); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 665 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[Aln alien
cannot obtain withholding of deportation unless he or she is eligible for ... asylum.").
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and other gender-related persecution.81
In an attempt to guide states on procedures and criteria for
determining refugee status, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") issued the Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
("Handbook"). 2 Then, in May 1995, the Office of Internal Affairs
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") took a
significant step forward in recognizing gender-related persecu-
81 Kelly, supra note 55, at 636. "For the most part, asylum law has developed
through the adjudication of the cases of male applicants and has therefore involved
an examination of traditionally male-dominated activities." Id.; see Malsonado-Cruz
v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp 970, 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Ghanaian male seeking asylum in United States to avoid persecu-
tion for his participation in coup attempt); In re Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 467 (1990)
(Afghan male who supported mujahedin seeking asylum to avoid persecution by Af-
ghan government); In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (1987) (Albanian male seek-
ing asylum to avoid political persecution); In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982)
(member of Afghan mujahidin seeking asylum in United States to avoid arrest by
Soviet backed government upon return). Aliens facing deportation may qualify for a
discretionary grant of suspended deportation upon a showing of (1) seven continu-
ous years of presence in the United States, (2) good moral character, and (3) ex-
treme hardship for themselves or family members who are United States citizens. 8
U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1) (1987). This statute was first tested on the basis of genital muti-
lation in March 1994, when Lydia Omowunmi Oluloro was granted a suspension of
deportation, based on her fear that her daughters, both United States citizens,
would be subjected to FGM if they returned to her home country of Nigeria. See
Mousette, supra note 25, n.328 (citing In re Lydia Omowunmi Oluloro, In Deporta-
tion Proceedings, Portland Oregon, No. A72-147-491 (Mar. 23, 1994) (oral decision)).
Oluloro was a native of Nigeria who entered the United States as a non-immigrant
visitor, married a Nigerian-born, United States permanent resident, and gave birth
to two United States born daughters. See Mousette, supra note 25, at 389; Patricia
Dysart Rudloff, In re Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital Mutilation as "Extreme Hard-
ship" In Immigration Proceedings, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 877, 878-79 (1995); see also
Brownlee et al., supra note 41, at 56 (describing Oluloro story); Timothy Egan, An
Ancient Ritual and a Mother's Asylum Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A25
(same). Subsequent to a divorce, Oluloro gained custody of her children, and because
she had been genitally mutilated when she was a child, feared they would be forced
to undergo FGM if she were deported. See Mousette, supra note 25, at 389-90; Rud-
loff, supra, at 878-79. Easily satisfying the continuous presence and moral character
elements, Immigration Judge Kendall Warren determined that although Oluloro
would not suffer extreme hardship if returned to Nigeria, her daughters would. See
Mousette, supra note 25, at 390; Rudloff, supra, at 898. Accordingly, the judge
granted Oluloro's application for suspension of deportation. See Mousette, supra
note 25, at 390. This decision marked a positive step toward acknowledging gender-
based claims. It offers little assistance in refugee applications, however, because the
court did not determine if the fear of FGM constituted persecution. Id. at 395.
'2 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
(1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
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tion claims by issuing a memorandum entitled Considerations
For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women
("INS Guidelines"). This memorandum provided "guidelines that
formally recognize gender-based persecution as a potential
ground for asylum."' Women fleeing FGM may still be denied
asylum, however, because the guidelines are merely designed to
provide asylum officers with procedures and methods to evaluate
gender-based discrimination and are not binding on immigration
courts.84
A. Persecution
The first factor an asylum applicant must demonstrate is
that female genital mutilation rises to the level of
"persecution."' The UNHCR Handbook notes that "serious vio-
lations of human rights ... [may] ... constitute persecution."86
The immigration statutes, however, do not define the term and
thus the courts are faced with the challenge of determining
whether FGM should be considered such a violation of human
rights and thus "persecution." In In re Acosta," the Board of
Immigration Appeals determined that "persecution" as used in
the Refugee Act "clearly contemplates that harm or suffering
must be inflicted upon an individual in order to punish him for
possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to over-
come."' A woman fleeing FGM faces the problem of proving the
act to be persecution although it is technically not a form of
punishment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, however, has defined persecution as "punishment
for political, religious, or other reasons that our country does not
recognize as legitimate."89 In order to comply with its obligations
under international human rights doctrine, the United States
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 (June 5, 1995). The memorandum was issued
subsequent to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR)
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, which acknowledged gender-
related asylum claims, and was modeled after guidelines established by Harvard's
Women Refugees Project. Setareh, supra note 43, at 125.
84 See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771; Setareh, supra note 43, at 125.
8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see In re Acosta, 19 1 & N Dec. at 219.
HANDBOOK, supra note 82, para. 51, at 14.
87 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (1985).
a Id. at 223.
83Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Zalega v. INS,
916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining persecution to be "the infliction of
suffering or harm ... in a way regarded as offensive").
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must recognize female genital mutilation, which is plainly not
"legitimate punishment," as "persecution" within the meaning of
the Refugee Act. Furthermore, according to the UNHCR Hand-
book, "an applicant may have been subjected to various meas-
ures not in themselves amounting to persecution ... [but] com-
bined with other adverse factors ... if taken together, [they]
produce an effect ... that can reasonably justify a claim to well-
founded fear of persecution on 'cumulative grounds.' s0 Under
this application, while the act of FGM may not be considered
persecution in and of itself, when combined with other factors
such as the lack of alternatives available to a woman, the health
risks involved, and the gross violation of her fundamental hu-
man rights, a court may synthesize these components and grant
asylum on "cumulative grounds," thus strengthening an asylum
claim based on FGM.
B. Well-founded
The second factor an asylum applicant must establish is that
her fear of persecution is well-founded.9 The Supreme Court's
decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca92 seems to have made this
the easiest obstacle to overcome. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court
ruled that the well-founded fear requirement is met if the appli-
cant faces a" 'reasonable possibility'" of persecution.93 Further-
more, the applicant's fear must meet both an objective and sub-
jective standard:94 a subjective fear is one that is genuine," and
90 HANDBOOK, supra note 82, para. 53, at 14-15.
9' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1994). Under Title 8, a person seeking to obtain
asylum must meet the definition of a refugee. Id.
9480 U.S. 421 (1987). In Cardoza-Fonseca, the INS had begun deportation pro-
ceedings against a 38 year old Nicaraguan citizen after she had remained in the
United States beyond the time permitted as a visitor. Id. at 421. While conceding
that she was in the country illegally, Ms. Cardoza-Fonseca requested asylum as a
refugee and the withholding of her deportation. Id.
93 Id. at 440 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984)). The Court,
noting that a less than fifty percent chance of facing persecution can be reasonable,
id. at 431, stated that even a ten percent chance may be sufficient to establish a
well-founded fear. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440; ATLE GRAHL-MADsEN, THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966).
94 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-32. The objective component requires the
person to "establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or
she will be subject to persecution upon deportation." Id. at 430 (citing Stevic, 467
U.S. at 422). In contrast, when determining the subjective component, eligibility
"turn[s] to some extent on the subjective mental state of the alien." Id. at 430-31.
95 Diaz-Escabor v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986); see In re Moghar-
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an objective fear is more than a "mere irrational apprehension."96
Women seeking asylum based on FGM may, nevertheless,
face difficulty in establishing their fear to be well-founded. In
cultures that practice FGM, women, who generally play a sub-
missive role, are conditioned to believe that they lack power to
speak out against the wishes of their dominant male counter-
parts.97 Moreover, the manifestation of a desire to avoid FGM is
viewed as a rejection of social mores of their community and a
dishonor to their families." As a result, the reluctance of these
women to discuss their situations may result in their stories be-
ing viewed as incredible.99
C. Government Participation
The woman seeking refugee status must further show that
her well-founded fear of persecution will be inflicted by the gov-
ernment or an individual the government is unable or unwilling
to control.' It is clear that FGM is not directly enforced by the
governments of those countries which practice it. Nevertheless,
by remaining silent and allowing FGM to be inflicted continu-
rabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (1987) (noting that fear can be well-founded if perse-
cution happened to similarly situated individuals).
'6 Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit
has stated that "group membership itself subjects the alien to a reasonable possibil-
ity of persecution, so that he or she will be able to satisfy the objective component of
the well-founded fear standard simply by proving membership in the targeted
group." Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994).
"' For example, despite one woman's opposition of subjecting her daughters to
the procedure, she deferred to the wishes of her husband, stating "[it is up to my
husband ... tt]he man makes the decisions about the children." Dugger, supra note
5, at 7.
93Bashir, supra note 12, at 440. FGM is a prerequisite for marriage in countries
in which it is practiced. In these countries where a single women has no independ-
ent means of support, these women are "socialized to believe that marriage and
motherhood are a duty, [so that] refusal to undergo this practice can have dire con-
sequences." INS Resource Information Center, Alert Series Women: Female Genital
Mutilation, July 3, 1994 (AIJNGA/94.001).
9 Id. The implementation of the new "grant-refer" system creates an additional
obstacle that the applicant must overcome to establish that the fear is indeed well-
founded. Under the new procedure, asylum officers can either grant asylum or refer
the applicant to an immigration judge for deportation proceedings. Id.; INS Final-
izes Reform Regulations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1577, 1579 (1994). It has been
suggested that the new procedures may jeopardize both applicants' rights and the
accuracy of asylum officers' decisions. Id.; Stephanie Kaye Pell, Adjudication of
Gender Persecution Cases Under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No
Reason to Fear an Onslaught of Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
655, 661 (1995).
3 ' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
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ously, the persecution can be attributed to the government.1"' In-
terestingly, only five countries that traditionally practice FGM
have implemented legislation prohibiting it. °2 Notwithstanding
such legislation, the practice continues with little, if any, re-
course. 103  Such governmental acquiescence obviously demon-
strates an unwillingness to terminate the torturous practice,
thereby providing women with no avenue for refuge.
D. On Account of...
The fourth and final element requires that the applicant
must demonstrate that the persecution she fears is on account of
one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 1 ' Women bringing
gender-based claims must attempt to "fit" their claim into one of
the five enumerated grounds since gender-related persecution is
not explicitly listed as a basis for seeking asylum. In most asy-
lum cases, women bring gender-related claims under the
"particular social group" category.' While this remedy has
gained international support,' the United States has been re-
luctant to include gender-based persecution within the scope of a
101 See Bashir, supra note 12, at 445. "[W]here serious violations of human
rights are committed and the state faces or refuses to act, such failure to act on the
part of the state is in itself an act of persecution." Pamela Goldberg, Any Place But
Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565, 570 (1993).
102 "Five countries - Sudan, Kenya, Egypt, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso - have
taken legal or policy measures against genital mutilation." Seble Dawit & Salem
Mekuria, The West Just Doesn't Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1993, at A2.
103 INS Resource Information Center, Alert Series Women: Female Genital
Mutilation, July 3, 1994. For example, in Sudan and Egypt, legislation allows partial
removal of the clitoris, id., while legislation in other countries condemns the prac-
tice without providing legal remedy. Roger Kaplan, Prisoners of Ritual, 25 FREEDOM
REV. 25, 29 (1992); see also Setareh, supra note 43, at 140 (stating that countries
with laws banning FGM rarely enforce such laws).
'04 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994); see also supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
105 Setareh, supra note 43, at 141. "Political opinion" is also commonly used in
gender-based asylum claims. Id. In order to recognize the reality of FGM, courts
must adopt a broader notion of "political opinion." Id. at 142. For a discussion of in-
terpreting social group under United States law, see Godfrey, supra note 12, at 259-
70 ("[T]he breadth of a social group is not a proper consideration for determining
whether a particular social group is cognizable under asylum law.").
'0 Canada and other nations that have adopted the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees have expanded the definition of refugee to in-
clude gender-based claims. See Moussette, supra note 25, at 367-69.
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"particular social group."" ' Notwithstanding this reluctance, two
tests have emerged from United States courts which, if met, may
result in a grant of asylum to women fleeing gender-based perse-
cution.'
One test, as set forth in In re Acosta,0 ' requires that mem-
bers of a particular social group share a "common, immutable
characteristic ... that the members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is funda-
mental to their individual identities or consciences." 0 Such
characteristics can be "innate ... such as sex, ... [or] might be a
shared past experience.""' The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, in Ananeh-Firempong v. INS," expanded
the "immutable characteristics" test to further require that the
members have "similar background[s], habits or social status.""'
Women fleeing FGM, therefore, clearly meet the "particular so-
cial group" standard set forth in Acosta due to their innate char-
acteristic of gender. Arguably, these women can also satisfy the
First Circuit's definition because it is probable that women
107 See Godfrey, supra note 12, at 270-74 (noting that United States courts' fail-
ure to include gender as "particular group"). United States case law indicates a lack
of consensus in defining the social group category. See, e.g., Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d
636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that women are too expansive to be "particular"
group but that Iranian women who challenge government may be "particular");
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3rd Cir. 1993) (accepting "sex" as innate char-
acteristic linking members of particular social group); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660,
664 (2d Cir. 1991) (indicating that gender is too broadly-based to be considered
"particular group"); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding class of young working males of military age is too broad to be considered
"particular group"); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (1985) (including sex
among possible "particular groups").
Bashir, supra note 12, at 447. The two tests for defining membership in a
"particular social group" were established in In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, and
Sanchez Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
"o 19 I. & N. Dec. 211.
"0 Id. at 233. The court firther stated that by construing persecution on account
of membership in a social group in this manner, the concept of a refugee would be
restricted to individuals "who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter
of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution." Id.
Ul Id.
" 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
" Id. at 626. This expansion of the "immutable characteristics" test was origi-
nally delineated in the HANDBOOK, supra note 82, para. 77, at 19, which has gen-
erally been considered to be authoritative and a "useful tool" for interpreting the
phrase "social group."Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 626. But see Sanchez-Trujillo,
801 F.2d at 1576 (noting that "the Handbook provides little assistance in arriving at
a workable definition of 'particular social group' ") (alteration in original).
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within a particular culture that practices female circumcision
share comparable backgrounds, habits, and social status.
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS," the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit established a more restrictive test.
The Ninth Circuit defined a particular social group as "a collec-
tion of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated
by some common impulse or interest"5 ... [requiring a] voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which
imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their
identity as a member of that discrete social group."1 " The court
supported this narrow interpretation by concluding that "[t]he
statutory words 'particular' and 'social' ... modify [the word]
'group'... [and thus] the term does not encompass every broadly
defined segment of a population, even if a certain demographic
division does have some statistical relevance."'17 The strict re-
quirements set forth by the Sanchez-Trujillo court ultimately
excludes broadly based groups, such as those delineated by gen-
der, from the particular social group category and, consequently,
some courts have determined that gender, in and of itself, does
not satisfy the definition."' Nevertheless, under a more liberal
application of the Ninth Circuit's requirements, a woman fleeing
FGM who voluntarily associated herself with other women in her
community rejecting FGM and believing the practice should be
discontinued may satisfy the court's definition of particular so-
cial group, despite a possible contradiction in the court's opin-
ion."
9
114 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
115 Id. at 1576.
"6 Id. at 1576. But cf. Daniel Compton, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A
Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar - Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 922-23 (criticizing Ninth Circuit's interpretation and
noting that court did not develop "useful standard for recognizing a 'particular social
group' ").
"7 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; see Godfrey, supra note 12 at 265. The
court further noted that "of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associa-
tional relationship among the purported members, which imparts some characteris-
tic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group."
Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
18 Godfrey, supra note 12, at 266; Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding gender is too broadly based to be considered "particular social
group"); Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-77 (excluding gender from "particular
social groups").
19 See Bashir, supra note 12, at 448 (noting that Sanchez-Trujillo opinion con-
tradicts itself by suggesting family as prototypical social group despite family's lack
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In more recent cases, the circuit courts have continued this
inconsistent application of the social group category in gender-
based asylum claims. In Fatin v. INS,2 the Third Circuit held
that Fatin satisfied the particular social group category "simply
because she [was] a woman.""2 The Eighth Circuit, however, in
Safaie v. INS,' applied a more narrow view, stating that "a
group of women, who refuse to conform and whose opposition is
so profound that they would choose to suffer the severe conse-
quences of noncompliance, may well satisfy the definition [of so-
cial group],"' but ultimately found that the applicant's fear of
persecution merely because she was an Iranian woman was
overbroad.' Finally, in Gomez v. INS,' the Second Circuit re-
jected a woman's claim for asylum, stating that "[plossession of
broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not
by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular
group."2
6
of voluntary associational relationship); Godfrey, supra note 105, at 267-68 (noting
criticism of Ninth Circuit's flawed logic); T. David Parish, Membership in a Particu-
lar Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Con-
cept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 942 (1992) (criticizing Sanchez-Trujillo
interpretation of social group as "drawn from faulty logic"). Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit later rejected its own example of social group, holding that a family unit falls
outside of the category. Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
"2 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
' Id. at 1240. The court established three elements that must be shown in or-
der to qualify for asylum based on membership in a particular social group: "[tihe
alien must (1) identify a group that constitutes a 'particular social group' within the
interpretation [of the Acosta court], (2) establish that he or she is a member of that
group, and (3) show that he or she would be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of
persecution based on that membership." Id. Although Fatin had satisfied the first
and second element, she was denied asylum because "ha[d] not shown that ... she
ha[d] a well-founded fear of... 'persecution' based solely on her gender." Id.
25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 640. The court relied on reasoning presented in Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec.
211,234(1985).
' Id. The court reasoned that no fact-finder could reasonably conclude that all
Iranian women had a well-founded fear of persecution based solely upon their gen-
der. Id.
u'947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
'Id. at 664. Gomez, a Salvadoran woman who had been raped and beaten by
guerrilla forces, feared recurrence if she returned to her home country. Id. at 662.
The court dismissed her petition for review of the BIAs denial of asylum, which had
concluded that she "failed to demonstrate that the guerrillas are inclined or will
seek to harm her based on her association with a particular social group or on ac-
count of any other ground enumerated in the Act." Id. at 663.
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D. Application
Prior to the issuance of the INS guidelines explicitly stating
that FGM is a form of persecution, 7 the United States had not
recognized FGM as a basis for gender-related persecution.128 The
problem persists, however, because the guidelines have not been
uniformly applied. For example, two recent cases involved Afri-
can women who had been victims of FGM. In one case, a Vir-
ginia immigration judge granted a woman asylum, declaring that
she had suffered "an atrocious form of persecution.""9 In the
other case, however, the women was denied asylum by a Mary-
land judge who explained that she had a choice of supporting the
practice, which he thought important for maintaining tribal
unity.3 ' Thus, despite the guidelines, the lack of a clear-cut
definition has led to disparate judgments.' Moreover, although
there have been three cases where the INS granted asylum to
applicants fleeing FGM,"'3 decisions by immigration judges pro-
duce no legal precedent for other courts and agencies and, conse-
quently, have provided little hope for women who seek to escape
this life threatening practice.
The predominant reason for failure to expand United States
Bashir, supra note 12, at 445.See IJ Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital
Mutilation, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1188 (1995) [hereinafter IJ Grants Asylum]
(noting that In re MK decision was first case determining asylum claim based on
FGM.).
129 In re M.K, No. A72-374-558 (IJ Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995). The immigra-
tion judge found that membership in a social group may consist of women who are
forced to undergo genital mutilation, and that although future persecution may be
unlikely, humanitarian asylum may be warranted if past persecution was "so atro-
cious the asylee should not be expected to repatriate." Id.; see Joshua B. Frank, IL
Grants Asylum to Citizen of Sierra Leone Who Suffered Forced Female Genital Muti-
lation, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. L. J. 613 (1995) (summarizing case); IJ Grants Asylum, su-
pra note 128, at 1188-90 (same).
12o In re J., No. A72-370-565 (IJ, Baltimore, Apr. 28, 1995) (stating that while
applicant "cannot change the fact that she is female, she can change her ... position
towards the FGM practice" and "acquiesce to the tribal position of FGM."); see Still
More on Asylum Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1375 (1995) (summarizing In re J.).
" See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1265 (Sept. 18, 1995) (stating varying rulings
of two cases show lack of consistency developed on issue); Pamela Constable, INS
Debates Female Mutilation as Basis for Asylum, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1995, at D1
(noting disparate results of In re M.X and In re J.).
12 Richard C. Reuben, New Ground for Asylum, 82 A.B.A. J. 36 (Aug. 1996); In
re M.K, No. A72-374-558 (IJ Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995); In re Oluloro, No. A72-
147-491 (Wash. EOIR Immigr. Ct. Mar. 23, 1994).
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asylum law was tersely expressed by the Ninth Circuit in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS: to do so would ultimately extend
"refugee status to every alien displaced by general conditions of
unrest or violence in his or her home country."133 This fear of
"opening the floodgates" underlies the United States restrictive
asylum policies."M This fear is unwarranted for several reasons.
First, asylum cases represent only a small part of the total
number of people immigrating to the United States. 35 Second,
both Canada and France have recognized female circumcision as
grounds for granting asylum, while neither country has experi-
enced an increase in the number of applicants. 35 Third, granting
asylum to a member of a group does not require granting asylum
to every member of that group.'37 The applicant must still prove
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of that member-
ship, and the grant of asylum remains discretionary.3 ' The fear
of "opening the floodgates," therefore, merely serves as justifica-
tion for the United States' failure to recognize female genital
mutilation as a legitimate basis for asylum. Recently, in In re
Kasinga,39 the BIA granted asylum to a woman who fled to the
United States in order to escape FGM and set binding precedent
for the 179 immigration judges who thus far have been divided
on the issue."
m Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577; see Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that fear of general conditions in El Salvador did not
amount to possibility of individual persecution).
m Godfrey, supra note 105, at 280. But see 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 772
(1995) (noting that INS does not expect increase in asylum claims resulting from
INS guidelines).
For example, in 1993, 900,000 people immigrated to the United States, but
only 145,000 entered under asylum claims. Hull, supra note 8, at 26. The INS does
not expect the Kasinga ruling to increase the number of asylum claims based on
FGM. Reuben, supra note 132, at 36.
"a See Basbir, supra note 12, at 453-54.
37 Godfrey, supra note 12, at 283-84 (stating that subgroups of broadly defined
groups are usually the only ones eligible for asylum). Thus, asylum can be limited to
specifically defined groups, or subgroups.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (1994); see Bashir, supra note 12, at 452-54.
'9 Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996).
' See Celia Dugger, Woman's Plea for AsylumPuts Tribal Ritual on Trial, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1996, at B4 [hereinafter Woman's Plea]; see also Reuben, supra note
132, at 36; Cindy Shiner, African Women Who Fled Circumcision is Granted Asy-
lum, U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals' Decision Binds Courts, Challenges Tradi-
tion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 7, 1996, at 19A (stating that "the ruling is bind-
ing on all U.S. immigration judges who hear asylum cases").
19971
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF KASINGA AND THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS DECISION
A. Fauziya's Story
Fauziya Kasinga" was one of five daughters born to Hajia
and Muhammad Kasinga, who were members of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu tribe of the west African nation of Togo." Mr. Kas-
inga's affluence provided his family with a lifestyle atypical from
that of the community," including the capability of his four older
daughters to choose their own husbands and avoid being geni-
tally mutilated. " Unfortunately, Mr. Kasinga died in 1993,
when Fauziya was seventeen years old and unmarried. 45 As
tribal custom dictates, Mr. Kasinga's sister, Hadja Mamoude,
became Fauziya's guardian46 and arranged for Fauziya to marry
a man who demanded that his future bride be circumcised.
47
Both Fauziya and her mother implored the family not to
proceed with the planned circumcision but their pleas went un-
heeded. 48 With no other alternative, Mrs. Kasinga gave her
daughter most of the money she had inherited from her husband
141 The correct spelling of the applicant's name is Kassindja, but it was mis-
spelled by immigration officials. Dugger, supra note 19, at B6. For simplicity, this
Comment will spell her name as it is documented.
12 Id. For additional articles about Kasinga's case, see Keith Donoghue, A Rite
of Passage: A Berkeley Lawyer's Client Could Establish Precedent for Asylum Claims
Based on Female Genital Mutilation, RECORDER, Jan. 18, 1996, at 1; Keith
Donoghue, Cultural Rite Tests Asylum Law, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 1; Judy
Mann, When Judges Fail, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at E3.
'43 Dugger, supra note 19, at B6. The family lived in an eight-bedroom house
with electricity and running water which were luxuries by tribal standards. Id. Fur-
thermore, the Kasinga children attended school, although the community consid-
ered educating women a "wast[e] [of] money." Id.
' Id. Mr. and Mrs. Kasinga recalled the agony endured by siblings and, thus,
vowed to protect their daughters from the ritual. See id.
'4 Dugger, supra note 19, at B6; see Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826
(BIA June 13, 1996); Bashir, supra note 12, at 436.
14 Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996); Bashir, supra
note 12, at 436; Dugger, supra note 19, at B6. Fauziya's aunt immediately discon-
tinued Fauziya's education, noting that girls "should [not] be too civilized." Id. Upon
her husband's death, Mrs. Kasinga was required, by tribal custom, to leave her
home and family. Id.
147 Dugger, supra note 19, at B6. The husband to be, Issakah Ibrahim, already
had three circumcised wives. Id. He offered the family "four bolts of ... cloth, six
veils, two pairs of shoes, four head scarves, a large washbasin and about $20" as a
gift to seal the marriage. Id.
148 Id.
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so Fauziya could escape.' 9 Fauziya fled to Germany, purchased
a counterfeit passport and flew to the United States, where she
immediately requested asylum upon arrival.50 She remained in
detention by the INS until April 1996.'
B. The Kasinga Decision and Rationale
In a decision dated August 25, 1995, the immigration judge
summarily denied Kasinga's application for asylum and ordered
her excluded and deported from the United States, finding her
story irrational and inconsistent.5 ' On June 13, 1996, the
United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Ap-
peals sustained the applicant's appeal, granted discretionary
asylum, and ordered her admitted to the United States as an
asylee.1
53
By an eleven to one vote,5" the BIA held that the practice of
female genital mutilation can be the basis for a grant of asylum
under federal immigration law.'55 Writing for the majority, Im-
migration Board chair Paul W. Schmidt stated that the Board
made seven major findings: (1) Fauziya Kasinga was a "credible
witness"; (2) "FGM, as practiced by the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe of Togo ... constitute[d] persecution"; (3) Fauziya Kasinga
was " a member of a social group consisting of young women of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as prac-
ticed by that tribe, and who oppose the practice"; (4) Fauziya
Kasinga "ha[d] a well-founded fear of persecution"; (5) "the per-
secution the applicant fear[ed] [was] 'on account of her social
group"; (6) "the applicant's fear of persecution [was] country-
wide"; and (7) Fauziya Kasinga was "eligible for and should be
granted asylum in the exercise of discretion."'56 Thus, Fauziya
Kasinga had a "well-founded fear of persecution in the form of
.. Id. As tribal custom dictates, Mrs. Kasinga had no rights to her husband's
wealth, most of which went to the family. She did, however, receive $3500. Id.
150 Dugger, supra note 19, at B6.
..1 Id. During her time in prison, Fauziya was beaten and tear-gassed, and sub-
sequently fell into a deep depression. Id.; see also Woman's Plea, supra note 140, at
B4 (describing Kasinga's experience while in detention).
152 In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996) (noting
that immigration judge had denied Kasinga's application for asylum).
1Id.
Interestingly, Board Member Fred W. Vacca dissented without opinion. Id.
Id. The parties were in disagreement about the "parameters of FGM as a
ground for asylum in future cases" in addition to the present case. Id.
In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996).
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FGM if returned to Togo" 5' and the persecution she feared was
on account of her social group, thereby satisfying the refugee re-
quirements."' The opinion stated clearly, however, that this de-
cision did not establish rules for cases that were not before the
Board."9 Nevertheless, the opinion specifically found that the
degree of FGM suffered by Kasinga constituted "persecution"
within the meaning of the Refugee Act. As support for its deci-
sion, the Board stated that "persecution can consist of the inflic-
tion of harm or suffering by ... persons a government is unwilling
or unable to control .. The Board further noted that
"subjective 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not required for
harm to constitute persecution." 6'
C. Analysis
The Kasinga ruling represents a long overdue effort by the
INS to expand antiquated laws to afford women protection from
gender-related persecution such as FGM. The decision is very
limited, however, and therefore is only a small step toward gen-
der equality under asylum law. The board defined "particular
social group" to be "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose the practice."'62 The board declined, however, to
"speculate on, or establish rules for, cases" not before it." Thus,
while a binding precedent has been set, it is limited such that
disparate rulings may still continue.
The INS guidelines similarly represent a positive attempt to
recognize that gender-related discrimination can satisfy the re-
quirements for refugee status.' The INS guidelines, which in
157 Id.
... 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994); Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826
(BIA June 13, 1996).
15"9 Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826.
160 Id. (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222-23 (BIA 1985)).
161 Id. (citing In re Kulle, 19 I. & N. Dec. 318 (BIA 1985)).
162 Id.
163 Id. The Board rejected the Immigration and Naturalization Service's request
to "endorse a significant new framework for assessing asylum claims in the context
of a single novel case," noting that such a task should be left to Congress. Id.
(Filppu, Board Member, concurring). But see Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WIL
379826 (Rosenberg, concurring) (noting that majority decision implicitly established
"road map" for future gender-based claims).
' Judith Gaines, INS Eases Asylum Guidelines for Women, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 27, 1995, at 13.
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large part adopted "Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims"
drafted by the Women's Refugee Project of Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts,'65 acknowledge that gender-based harm, such as female
circumcision, may rise to the level of persecution,166 and suggest
a three part analysis.
The first step is to determine whether the harm sought to be
avoided constitutes persecution.67 Harm that satisfies the first
step includes "serious physical harm, loss of freedom, other seri-
ous violation of basic human rights as defined by international
human rights instruments, discriminatory treatment, or a com-
bination of numerous harms which when considered cumula-
tively creates a well-founded fear of persecution."68 The second
step requires a recognition that women who bring gender-related
asylum claims "face special difficulty of proof," and thus, sug-
gests that the applicant's own testimony is sufficient. 6 ' The fi-
nal step addresses procedural issues, and recognizes that women
who experience gender-based persecution may be reluctant to
discuss their situation.Y These guidelines are useful insofar as
will assist the adjudicator evaluate the applicant's testimony, so
as not to equate reluctance with incredibility.'' While represent-
ing a pragmatic foundation to the recognition of gender-based
asylum cases, these guidelines, however, are merely advisory.
Courts thus retain discretion to continue restrictive application
of the Refugee Act.
'65 See Mousette, supra note 25, at 393.
'1c Id. at 390-91. These "guidelines are advisory and apply only to the INS asy-
lum officers, who rule on claims by aliens already inside this country." Marcia Coyle,
Exhibit A 'They Shouldn't Be Done' Case Could Widen the Grounds for Asylum, A
Young Woman's Fear of Being Mutilated Could Pave Way for Gender-Based Peti-
tions, NAT'L L.J. May 6, 1996, at A10.
'6 Mousette, supra note 25, at 391
'6 Id at 392. Neither a showing of widespread practice of FGM, nor the lack of
proof that it exists nationwide, will defeat an applicant's claim. Id.
'6 Id. at 392-93. The applicant's testimony is often the only evidence available.
Id.
170 Mousette, supra note 25, at 393. These guidelines also provided that the in-
terview of women asylum applicants should be conducted by women if possible. Id.
The use of interpreters and presence of family members during an applicant's testi-
mony can also inhibit her testimony because of the sensitive issues involved with
sexual abuse. Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 771, 799-800 (1995).
171 Id.
1,7 See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 (June 5, 1996); Seterah, supra note 43, at
151 (discussing the shortcomings of INS guidelines); see also Coyle, supra note 168,
at A10 (stating that guidelines are only advisory).
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Most recently, the United States has sent a strong message
to its inhabitants and the international community by passing
legislation which outlaws FGM. 173  The federal law imposes a
prison term of up to five years on anyone who "circumcises, ex-
cises or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or
labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained
the age of 18."174 Members of Congress believe that this sends a
strong message to immigrants that they must abandon FGM,
which threatens more than 150,000 females of African origin in
the United States.17 ' A separate measure, which takes affect
next year, will make the United States' "support for loans from
international financial institutions dependent on foreign gov-
ernments carrying out educational campaigns against genital
cutting."
176
Although, in the past, the United States has failed to take a
clear stance against the practice of female genital mutilation, the
Kasinga decision in conjunction with the INS guidelines and the
federal prohibition of FGM clearly indicate that the United
States' position is beginning to change. These steps demonstrate
that the United States is finally condemning FGM both domesti-
cally and internationally, and supporting the global struggle
against it. Unfortunately, however, this is not enough. The
Refugee Act must be amended to include gender persecution as
one of the enumerated grounds for seeking asylum. Only then
can we be sure that women fleeing FGM will not "slip through
the cracks" of our inconsistent and incomplete asylum laws as
they are today. Until then, Kasinga offers a small glimmer of
hope to those seeking asylum from gender-based persecution.
CONCLUSION
Despite the numerous human rights documents it violates,
women throughout the world are being forced to undergo the tor-
turous, inhumane act of female genital mutilation. Female geni-
tal mutilation is indisputably persecution and must be treated as
' See Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see also Celia W. Dugger, New Law Bans Genital
Cutting In United States, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1996 at A5.
174 Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-208 § 654, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Dugger, supra note 173, at 28.
175 Dugger, supra note 173, at 28.
"7' Id.; Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 579, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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such. While communities around the world are free to enjoy
their own cultures, such an egregious violation of basic, funda-
mental human rights can not be justified by culture or any other
proffered reason. The United States must provide these women
with a safe haven from the physical and psychological brutality
that they seek to escape.
As United States asylum law now stands, a woman fleeing
FGM may be denied asylum simply because her claim does not
fit easily into a law that was written to reflect the experiences of
men. The only means to guarantee gender equality in asylum
law is to legislatively include gender persecution as a ground for
establishing refugee status. Until that is done, it is imperative
that the courts establish a framework whereby gender is incor-
porated into the "particular social group" category. Only then
will bias, inconsistency, and disparity disappear from gender-
based asylum claims.
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